Indigents exempted from paying filing fees

Dear PAO,
I am writing for my mother whose date of birth was erroneously entered in their marriage contract. To correct the date, my mother has to file a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. Is there a chance that my mother can be exempted from paying the fees for the filing of the petition?
Chloe

Dear Chloe,
The enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 simplified the process of correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, which are regarded as typographical or clerical errors. Civil registrars and consul generals were authorized by the said law to correct these erroneous entries. This is according to Section 1 thereof, which was amended by R.A. No. 10172, which reads as follows:

“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.”

Assuming that the error in your parents’ marriage contract is clerical or typographical error, indeed a petition before the Local Civil Registrar may be filed to correct the same. However, a fee shall be collected before the petition is acted upon by the said officer. To be exempt from the payment of the said fee, it must be proven that the petitioner is indigent. This is according to Section 8 of the said law as amended by R.A. Act No. 10172,which provides:

“SEC. 8. Payment of Fees. The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be authorized to collect reasonable fees as a condition for accepting the petition. An indigent petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of the said fee.

xxx”

In the same vein, an indigent petitioner refers to a destitute, needy and poor individual who is certified as such by the social welfare and development office of the city/municipal government. (2.7, Rule 2, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2001, Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of Republic Act No. 9048)

Based on the foregoing discussion, to be exempted from paying the required filing fee for the abovementioned petition, your mother has to prove that she is indigent. This can be done through a certification to be issued by the local social welfare and development office in your locality, certifying among other things that your mother is indigent.

Again, we find it necessary to mention that this opinion is solely based on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. The opinion may vary when the facts are changed or elaborated.

We hope that we were able to enlighten you on the matter.

By the SC, not by the UN

The United Nations (UN) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) was widely reported to have opined that “the detention of former President [Gloria Macapagal] Arroyo (GMA) was arbitrary and illegal under international law … with an enforceable right to compensation.”

Bail denied. Commenting on this opinion obtained by international celebrity lawyer Amal Alamuddin Clooney, Communications Secretary Herminio Coloma Jr. said that GMA “has been accorded due process and has availed herself of various legal remedies … in Philippine courts, which have sole jurisdiction to decide on such matters.”

And may I add that the controversy is about a mere “opinion” of a UN “working group” which does not have the coercive power of a treaty, or a customary international law, or a decision made after trial and hearing of an international tribunal like the International Court of Justice, or the International Criminal Court, or of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, where the Philippine claim in the West Philippine Sea is being heard.

GMA faces two major suits: (1) electoral sabotage, a capital offense, in the regional trial court (RTC) of Pasay for her alleged role in the manipulation of the 2007 election results in Maguindanao, and (2) plunder, also a capital offense, in the Sandiganbayan (SBN) for her alleged participation in the illegal use of P366 million in funds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO).

She was granted bail by the RTC (affirmed by the Court of Appeals) because the prosecution failed to prove that “the evidence of guilt is strong.” However, the SBN denied her plea for bail in the PCSO case.

After the prosecution finished presenting its evidence in the PCSO case, the defense filed a “demurrer” on the ground that the evidence presented had failed to prove GMA’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Demurrer also denied. However, a Special SBN Division of five, voting 3-2, denied the demurrer and ruled that the prosecution has proven her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and asked her to present countervailing evidence. Otherwise, she would be at risk of conviction.

Significantly, and this was noted in the WGAD opinion, the demurrer of her four coaccused (former PCSO chair Manuel Morato, former PCSO board members Raymundo Roquero and Jose Taruc, and former Commission on Audit chair Reynaldo Villar) was granted, resulting in their acquittal.

The charge against another coaccused, former PCSO chair Sergio Valencia, was downgraded to malversation. Since this is not a capital offense, he was allowed to post a bail bond of P500,000. Only GMA and another coaccused, former PCSO executive Benigno Aguas, were neither acquitted nor granted bail.

Failing in her bid for demurrer and bail, GMA filed a motion in the SBN to change her confinement from the Veterans Memorial Medical Center to her home at 14 Badjao Street, La Vista, Quezon City. In view of the recent WGAD opinion, she is renewing her plea for bail.

Equal protection. I believe, however, that more compelling than the WGAD opinion—which, as Coloma correctly pointed out, is not binding on our judiciary—is the recent Supreme Court decision (Ponce Enrile vs Sandiganbayan, Aug. 18, 2015) granting bail to Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile.

Bail was allowed, not because the prosecution (the Office of the Ombudsman) failed to present “strong” evidence of guilt, but because of (1) Enrile’s “fragile” health (uncontrolled hypertension, arrhythmia, coronary calcifications, and exacerbations of asthma-COPD overlap syndrome) and (2) advanced age (“already over 70 years old at the time of the alleged commission of the offense”).

Veering away from “strong evidence of guilt” as the only constitutionally-mandated ground to grant bail in capital offenses, the Court said that the SBN “arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial…”

True, this 8-4 decision was heavily criticized by the dissenting opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen. However, whether we agree with it or not, once affirmed to be final (through a denial of the pending motion for reconsideration), it becomes a binding precedent.

Citing the equal protection of the law, GMA’s lawyers could obtain bail if they can show that, like Enrile, she is not a flight risk because of her fragile health and advanced age.

Ineluctably, GMA could secure her longed-for temporary liberty because of that Supreme Court decision, not of the much-publicized WGAD opinion.

source:  

WITH DUE RESPECT 

By: Artemio V. Panganiban

Philippine Daily Inquirer

Prescriptive period stops once complaint is filed

Dear PAO,
I know that light offenses such as Slight Physical Injuries prescribe in two months. The period stops when a complaint in the barangay is filed. When then will it continue to run? 
Doro

Dear Doro,
The running of the prescriptive period of an offense stops from the moment the same is brought under the Katarungang Pambarangay. It will continue to run after the Certification to File Action or the Certificate of Repudiation is issued. This is according to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides:

“Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. —

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. — While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.

xxx xxx xxx”

As can be gleaned from the aforementioned law, the running of the prescriptive period of an offense is suspended temporarily once the complaint is filed before the Barangay Chairman under the Katarungang Pambarangay. However, as likewise stated above, such suspension shall last for only 60 days. Beyond the said period, the prescriptive period shall continue to run even if no certification is i ssued yet.

It is worthy to mention at this point that a complainant may file a case, which falls within the jurisdiction of Katarungang Pambarangay, directly in court or other government agencies without having to undergo conciliation before the Barangay, under the circumstances as provided by Rule VIII (b), Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to wit:

“[b] Notwithstanding the foregoing rule, however, a complainant may institute proceedings directly in court or with the proper government office, in the following enumerated cases where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued:

[1] In a criminal case where the accused was arrested without a warrant and is under police custody or detention, the criminal complaint or information may directly be filed by the offended party, police or fiscal with the proper court;

[2] A person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of his liberty or one acting in his behalf may directly file a petition for habeas corpus with the proper court to regain custody or secure the release of such person;

[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the action; and

[4] Where the action may otherwise no longer be filed in court because it may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.” (Em- phasis Supplied)

Again, we find it necessary to mention that this opinion is solely based on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. The opinion may vary when the facts are changed or elaborated.

We hope that we were able to enlighten you on the matter.

Editor’s note: Dear PAO is a daily column of the Public Attorney’s Office. Questions for Chief Acosta may be sent to dearpao@manilatimes.net

Using the public to become a listed company

IT is up to the officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to use their regulatory powers to apply the rules on preemptive rights. As the signing authority in approving amendments to the corporate charters of listed companies, they could withhold their imprimatur on any and all changes in a company’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and more so if these changes might “disenfranchise” the public.

Perhaps SEC Chairperson Teresita Herbosa and her four fellow commissioners know that without the public, there would have been no Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) for them to regulate. Even if the PSE already enjoys self-regulatory status, Herbosa and company should be able to protect the investing public from being taken advantage by those who control the boards of corporations.

It is unfortunate that family-owned companies are only using the public for them to be able to get listed. Having become public which, of course, is a misnomer, and finding no use for public investors anymore, the majority stockholders use the boards that they dominate to buy the public out. The practice called share buyback literally means taking a company private again.

No board seat for public
By the way, it is about time the SEC initiate a study of listed companies to determine if they are also public as they claim to be. If the public really own at least 10 percent of a company’s outstanding shares, how come they are not represented in the board? Instead, those who control the board select the independent directors, who do not own enough number of shares to entitle them to a directorship and the compensation and other benefits that go with their selection.

Have Herbosa and her four associates in the five-man commission ever bothered to ask the beneficial owners of the shares held by PCD Nominee Corp.? How about the corporate stockholders of listed companies that give their addresses somewhere else? SEC officials should be able to form a group of their expert securities examiners to identify the owners of all these offshore companies for the information of the public.

It seems that depriving public investors of their preemptive rights is not the only problem that ails the Philippine stock market. The 10-percent minimum public ownership rule could even be worse than depriving the public of their rights to the issuance of additional shares. How can this very small percentage of ownership qualify a listed company to become public?

Herbosa’s commission
Incidentally, Herbosa could have become the chief securities regulator that she is perceived to be had she followed the directive of the Supreme Court in the case involving foreign ownership in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT). Instead of investigating PLDT as the high court had suggested in its ruling, the SEC, led by Herbosa, simply allowed the company to issue 150 million voting preferred shares that are also voted by the Indonesian group.

The stock issuance was intended to dilute the holdings of foreigners in PLDT, such as the Indonesian-owned First Pacific Co. Ltd. which is based in Hong Kong, and NTT Group of Japan. These two stockholders hold a total of 99.2 million common shares, or 45.92 percent.

Why not revisit the SC ruling in the PLDT ownership case? Was allowing the issuance of 150 million voting preferred shares full compliance of the SC directive for the SEC to look into the foreign ownership issue in PLDT, “and if there is a violation . . . to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law”?

Apparently, the Herbosa-led five-person SEC regulatory body cleared PLDT of any equity ownership violation. This despite the SC’s ruling that, as provided for in the 1987 Constitution, the term capital “refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares and not to the total outstanding stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).”

esdperez@gmail.com.

source: Manila Times Column of EMETERIO SD. PEREZ

Supreme Court chooses decency, not expediency

IT is laudable and encouraging that the Supreme Court decided last week to give due course to the citizens’ petition for immediate action against officials behind the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) and the misuse of the pork barrel or PDAF by asking the Ombudsman to comment on the petition.

In issuing the order, the Supremes were not hampered by worries about the feelings of the sitting president. Instead of voting for political expediency, it declared that decency in government must come first. For this is as it should be. And this is what our people have long been craving for in this country.

Specifically, the SC ordered Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales and Justice Secretary Leila de Lima to comment on the petition that seeks the issuance of a judicial order that will compel the Ombudsman to investigate the authors, proponents and implementers of the disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) and pursue the investigation and prosecution of persons involved in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam.

This is a huge step forward because until the SC decided to accept the case, we the people had been consigned to living with the seeming impunity (exemption from punishment) of high public officials for crimes in their official conduct, as no investigations and no charges were being filed against them despite decisions already made by the High Court on the illegality of the DAP and PDAF.

If anyone should be mad about the inaction, it is the SC because its decisions that are being ignored.

We have watched with frustration as Budget Secretary Florencio Abad has continued his rape of the budget, and sleeps well with his loot intact, while the public suffers from the miseries of misgovernance and government corruption.

With this case going forward, the nation now knows that President Aquino, regardless of his presidential immunity, will be investigated for his critical part in the depredations of the DAP and PDAF.

If the petition for mandamus is granted, the Ombudsman and the justice department must perform their statutory duty to probe Aquino for impeachment purposes, and to investigate Abad, Senate President Franklin Drilon and Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr. for their respective roles in facilitating such a massive looting of the public treasury.

There is no question here that the president can be investigated by the Ombudsman for “any serious misconduct in office.” His so-called presidential immunity does not exempt him because no one is above the law.

Within the high court, there is one thorn which the public should worry about. Among the justices, Junior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen showed once again his total subservience to President Aquino, who appointed him to his post after negotiating the infamous Comprehensive Agreementr on the Bangsamoro (CAB).

Leonen pushed for the immediate junking of the petition, but he was totally swamped by his colleagues who believe that Aquino, like all other officials, must be subjected to investigation – even if the investigation will be conducted by officials who owe their positions to him, namely Ombudsman Morales and Justice Secretary De Lima.

Justice Leonen misunderstands the institution that he is fortunate to be a member of. He has not realize yet that temperamentally and judiciously, the Court has decisively moved towards the affirmation of decency in government and the rejection of immorality in public service. It will consistently do the right thing when asked to rule on an issue vital to the public interest.

We pray he, like the Chief Justice, herself an Aquino appointee, learns to value the dignity and vital role of the Supreme Court in keeping our Republic and its institutions alive and well by being a fount of wisdom and civic virtue.

source:  Manila Times

After granting bail to Enrile, will Supreme Court do the same for Arroyo?

The Supreme Court has final authority on questions of law, including the Constitution. In the legal community, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement is law. And the gods of Padre Faura have spoken.

Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin declared that “Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.” The Supreme Court ruled, therefore, that the fragile state of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile’s health presented a compelling justification for his admission to bail.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen vented in his dissenting opinion that the granting of bail to Sen. Enrile for humanitarian reason set a dangerous precedent.

The decision “will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion,” wrote the most junior member of the Court.

Every court, including the Supreme Court itself, is now bound by that precedent. Bail will be granted if the poor health of the petitioner justifies it, even if not presented by the accused as the basis of his plea for provisional liberty. Sen. Enrile did not present his feeble health as argument for his release from detention.

However, those who expect human rights lawyers to swamp the courts with petition for bail for the hundreds of enfeebled septuagenarian and octogenarian languishing in penal colonies and city jails on the basis of the new law would be terribly disappointed. Justice Leonen said that the decision was ‘especially tailored’ for Enrile. I say it was “coutouriered” exclusively for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Take note of what Associate Justice Bersamin, who penned the decision, said of Sen. Enrile, “With his solid reputation in his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.” Only former president Gloria Arroyo among the many ailing lolos andlolas in prisons can be described similarly.

Sen. Enrile was confined for a year in a general hospital because his fragile health required continuous medical attention and care.

With the death of Andal S. Ampatuan, Sr. only Mrs. Arroyo, who has remained in custody in the Veterans Memorial Medical Center since December 2013, among the many aged and ill prisoners, is situated similarly.

Sometime in October 2010, retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban wrote in his Philippine Daily Inquirer column: “The sociological school of legal philosophy holds that to predict how case would be decided (by the Supreme Court), one must consider the personality of the magistrate and the various stimuli attendant to a case per this formula: personality times stimuli equals decision (P x S = D). The personality of a magistrate includes intrinsic qualities like upbringing, education, relationships, etc. Stimuli refer to how he/she responds to externals like public opinion, peer pressure, religious leaders, medical condition, appointing authority, appointment sponsor, close friends, etc.”

That observation strongly suggested that justices of the Supreme Court sometimes decide not only on the basis of an objective interpretation of the law and the established facts but on personal considerations as well. The suggestion led me to believe that some of the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court under former chief justice Renato C. Corona were prompted by personal considerations.

Renato Corona would not have been chosen Chief Justice of the Supreme Court if a provision of the Constitution had been observed. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the President from making any appointment two months before the presidential election up to the end of his/her term. The presidential election was held on May 10, 2010 and Pres. Arroyo’s term was to end on June 30, 2010.

President-elect Benigno S. C. Aquino III had made known he was not going to replace retired Chief Justice Reynato Puno with Mr. Corona. So, Pres. Arroyo appointed Mr. Corona, her former chief of staff, Chief Justice on May 12, 2010, in violation of the Constitution as the appointment was made within the prohibition period.

The same associate justices set aside the Constitution so that Diosdado Ignacio “Dado” M. Arroyo, son of Mrs. Arroyo, can have a district to represent. The representative of the old 2nd District of Camarines Sur before Mr. Arroyo wanted to be back in Congress as the district’s representative. The Arroyo-subservient Congress broke up the district into two, one for Mr. Arroyo and the other for the former representative, Rolando G. Andaya, Jr.

That act of Congress was questioned before the Supreme Court as there would be disproportionate representation of Camarines Sur in Congress in contravention of the provision of the Constitution on equal representation. However, the Court upheld Congress. So, the district formerly represented in Congress by one congressman is now represented by two whereas the two larger districts are represented by only one each.

The older brother of Dado, Juan Miguel “Mikey” M. Arroyo, also had to have a seat in Congress, his old seat having been taken by his mother. The sycophants of Mrs. Arroyo in the Commission on Elections allowed him to represent Ang Galing Pinoy, the party-list of tricycle drivers and security guards, in Congress. Some groups questioned before the Court the eligibility of millionaire Mr. Mikey Arroyo to represent tricycle drivers and security guards. The Court quickly dismissed the disqualification complaint, saying that the case was outside its jurisdiction.

But the same Corona Court moved swiftly to stop impeachment proceedings against Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez following her petition for certiorari and prohibition, when impeachment is well within the province of the House of Representatives.

In 2011, Mrs. Arroyo, who had been charged with electoral fraud, was under a hold departure order (HDO).

On Nov. 15 of the same year, the Corona Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the HDO. Those who voted in favor of the issuance of the TRO were Chief Justice Corona, Associate Justices Bersamin, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Jose P. Perez, Martin S. Villarama Jr., and. Roberto A. Abad, all appointees of Mrs. Arroyo to the Supreme Court. Mr. Abad retired last year.

According to some nonpartisan lawyers, Chief Justice Corona should have called an en banc session to hear the oral arguments against the TRO before issuing it and making it immediately executory. The undue and unusual haste with which the TRO was issued raised the suspicion that the appointees of Mrs. Arroyo to the Supreme Court were really giving her the chance to flee.

Those who voted in favor of the precedent-setting ruling to grant provisional liberty to the accused for humanitarian reason were Associate Justices Bersamin, Brion, Peralta, Velasco, Perez, and Teresita Leonardo-de Castro (also an appointee of Mrs. Arroyo). Associate Justice Villarama was on leave.

In our democratic system of government the enactment of laws rests with the duly elected representatives of the people, the members of Congress. But eight lawyers unelected by the people have in effect enacted a new law seemingly to benefit a person, Mrs. Arroyo, to whom they are all beholden.

Oscar P. Lagman, Jr. is a member of Manindigan!, a cause-oriented group that takes stands on national issues.

oplagman@yahoo.com

source:  Businessworld

SC grants Enrile plea

Sandigan compelled to reinvestigate plunder, graft cases

The Supreme Court (SC) on Tuesday granted a petition by detained Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile to be given a Bill of Particulars or details of the cases filed against him before the Sandiganbayan to enable him to properly plead and prepare for his graft and plunder trial.

The High Court, sitting en banc, voted 8-5 in favor of Enrile’s petition that was filed in August last year, SC spokesman Theodore Te told reporters.

“In light of the court action, petitioner Senator Enrile is given the opportunity to confirm or change the plea that the Sandiganbayan entered for him, if he so wishes,” Te said.

The SC, however, failed to vote on Enrile’s petition for bail for lack of time as the justices had to hear the oral arguments in the Torre de Manila case.

With the granting of Enrile’s petition, the case will go back to the Office of the Ombudsman, in the process possibly compelling Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales to reinvestigate the cases filed against the 91-year-old lawmaker.

Voting in favor of Enrile’s “Bill of Particulars” petition were Associate Justices Presbitero Velasco, Teresita Leonardo-de Castro, Arturo Brion, Diosdado Peralta, Lucas Bersamin, Jose Perez, Jose Mendoza and Estela Perlas-Bernabe while dissenting were Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno and Associate Justices Antonio Carpio, Mariano del Castillo, Martin Villarama and Marvic Leonen.

Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes was on leave, while Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza inhibited from participating in the case as he was the Solicitor General when the case was initially filed.

Named respondents in Enrile’s petition were Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Amparo Cabotaje-Tang, and Associate Justices Samuel Martires and Alex Quiroz of the anti-graft court’s Third Division, which handles the senator’s plunder and graft cases.

Enrile was charged by the Office of the Ombudsman with one count of plunder and 15 counts of graft in connection with his alleged involvement in the so-called pork barrel scam, which was claimed to be masterminded by businesswoman Janet Lim-Napoles.

Enrile and his former chief of staff Jessica Lucila “Gigi” Reyes were accused of amassing P172.8 million in kickbacks from 2004 to 2010 through non-government organizations associated with Napoles.

Enrile told the High Court that the Sandiganbayan acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, when it compelled him to plead to the criminal charges without granting his “Motion for Bill of Particulars.”

Under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an accused has the right to move for a “Bill of Particulars” to enable him or her to properly plead and prepare for the trial.

Through the “Bill of Particulars,” an accused can ask for details of the case being lodged against him, including particular facts or pieces of information about the case, to ensure that the trial would be fair.

“The denial by the Sandiganbayan of petitioner Enrile’s ‘Motion for Bill of Particulars’ compels him to go to trial practically with one eye blindfolded,” the petition read.
Among the details of the case that Enrile wanted to know before he was arraigned were:

• Names of the specific people who delivered and received the over P172 million he
allegedly pocketed, as well as the dates and places where the money was delivered;

• Description of each project funded by Enrile’s “pork barrel” or Priority Development Assistance Fund, including details on who identified the projects, nature, location and costs of the projects;

• What particular Commission on Audit’s audits and field investigations were conducted to validate findings that Enrile’s PDAFs went to ghost projects;

• How Enrile allegedly took undue advantage of his government position to enrich himself at the expense of the people;

• Who amassed or acquired the accumulated amount of over P172 million;

•With whom did Enrile conspire;

•What particular acts constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal acts” that were done to accumulate the amount, what particular acts constitute the “series” and who among the accused committed these acts.

source:  Manila Times